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limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
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OVERVIEW 
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
	
This issue of the Monitor has articles on the role of the G20 in tackling 
the ‘too big to fail’ dilemma of major financial institutions, combating tax 
evasion and avoidance through ‘base erosion and profit shifting’ (BEPS), 
and a report from the ‘G20 and Development’ conference that was 
recently hosted by the G20 Studies Centre and Griffith University. 
 
ENDING ‘TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL’ 
Stephen Grenville’s article explores the efforts of the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) to deal with the situation where a financial institution is so 
large and interconnected that its failure would have disastrous 
implications for the economy, and must therefore be supported by the 
government if it gets into difficulty. Such firms are considered ‘too-big-to-
fail’ (TBTF). As Grenville notes, the 2008 financial crisis dramatically 
brought this issue into prominence, and dealing with TBTF has 
subsequently been a priority of the FSB. G20 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors declared at their meeting in Sydney in February 
2014 that they were committed to ‘ending’ TBTF by the Brisbane Summit 
in November 2014. 
Grenville outlines the problem of TBTF and canvasses possible 
remedies, including why some measures are resisted by the financial 
sector. He makes the important observation that crises are rare, and 
their cost fades from memory, not least for policy-makers. As with all 
aspects of financial regulation, Grenville identifies that the challenge is to 
establish a sensible trade-off between reducing the ex-post cost of 
TBTF, while minimising the ex-ante costs of doing so. His conclusion is 
that while the problem of TBTF can be reduced, it will not end. As he 
points out, such an ambitious objective to definitively end TBTF would be 
like trying to end crime. 
 
BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
My paper provides some observations on the work to date by the 
OECD/G20 project to combat tax avoidance and evasion through base 
erosion and profit shifting. BEPS essentially refers to corporate entities 
                                                
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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artificially exploiting loopholes in different countries’ tax laws to reduce or 
avoid taxation.  
Dealing with BEPS has been identified as a priority of the G20 and an 
OECD/G20 project has been launched with an ambitious program 
covering fifteen action items. Reports are to be completed by September 
2014 and September 2015. I note that expectations regarding what will 
be delivered through the BEPS project vary, with some believing it will 
be a game changer in terms of international taxation, while others are 
more sceptical. Canvassing all the discussion drafts that have been 
released for comment by the OECD, along with the vast range of 
comments that have been submitted, I note that a key impression 
coming through is the existence of a number of contradictions. These 
contradictions include whether BEPS is addressing new or old issues, 
the scale of the problem, the tax base being protected and whether it is 
possible to deal with BEPS without reopening some fundamental 
international tax issues, such as those involving residence and source 
taxation and the centrality of the arm’s length principle in the context of 
transfer pricing. Recognising the complexity of the issues, I suggest that 
greater weight should be placed on the power of transparency in 
minimising aggressive tax planning strategies. I also note that the 
OECD/G20 BEPS exercise represents a potentially far-reaching change 
in the governance arrangements for dealing with international tax issues. 
 
REPORT FROM G20 AND DEVELOPMENT 
CONFERENCE 
On 5 May 2014, the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute and Griffith 
University jointly hosted a conference in Brisbane on G20 and 
development. Daniela Strube provides a brief overview of the issues 
covered at the conference. 
The conference was divided into four sessions, with presentations from a 
range of speakers from Australia and overseas. The conference 
program can be found online.2 The sessions covered the G20 as a 
global steering committee, the G20 as a development actor, 
mainstreaming development in the G20 agenda, and the G20’s 
contribution in other development policy areas. 
 
                                                
2 Lowy Institute for International Policy and Griffith University, “G20 and Development 
Conference Program,” (5 May 2014). Available at: 
http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/596060/G20-and-Development-
Conference-Program-with-times-1.pdf. 
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Strube observes that the conference produced an insightful debate 
about the key challenges to the G20’s development agenda at a 
dynamic time in the international development policy arena. She also 
observes that there was broad consensus that the G20’s development 
agenda must be more than an add-on to its core priorities. In short, 
development should be ‘mainstreamed’ into the G20’s agenda. 
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ENDING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL 
STEPHEN GRENVILLE1 
INTRODUCTION 
Until the 2008 financial crisis, ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) had been a part of 
central banking lore, but played a relatively minor role. The 2008 crisis 
brought it into dramatic prominence. Reflecting this change and the 
widespread determination to develop appropriate policies in response to 
this perception of greatly increased risk, ‘ending TBTF’ entered the G20 
agenda early. It is on the Brisbane agenda, in accordance with the 
decision at the St Petersburg Summit.2 The issue is operationally in the 
hands of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the FSB Chairman has 
undertaken to complete this agenda item by the Brisbane meeting in 
November.3 
The central argument of this note is that much can be done (and has 
been done) to address the challenges raised by TBTF, but it cannot be 
definitively ‘ended’. This is not a counsel of despair, but recognition of 
reality. Like many other issues, there is a trade-off along a spectrum of 
options. ‘Ending TBTF’ would be like ‘ending crime’. Strong 
comprehensive measures come closer to ‘ending’ the problem, but are 
costly to implement and distort the financial structure. Finding the right 
place on this spectrum is the collective challenge for the FSB and the 
G20. 
                                                
1 Nonresident Fellow, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 At the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, G20 Leaders called on the FSB to propose 
measures to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs). At the Seoul Summit the Leaders endorsed the 
FSP ‘Framework for reducing the moral hazard of systemically important banks (SIBs)’; 
At the St Petersburg Summit, the scope was widened beyond the SIBs: 
“We renew our commitment to make any necessary reforms to implement fully the 
FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for all parts of the financial sector 
that could cause systemic problems”, see G20, “G20 Leaders' Declaration, St 
Petersburg,” (6 September 2013). Available at: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-
0906-declaration.html.	
3 Specifically, FSB Chairman Mark Carney outlines that (1) “A global standard for a 
minimum level of gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity that global systemically 
important banks should hold will be proposed by the FSB”, (2) “Proposals will be 
developed by the FSB for contractual or statutory approaches for cross-border 
recognition of resolution actions, including bail-in and temporary stays on the close-out 
of financial contracts, and cross-default rights when a firm enters resolution”, and (3) 
“The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) will finalise a basic 
capital requirement on which higher loss absorbency for global systemically important 
insurers will be built.’ For the full letter, see: Mark Carney, “Letter from the Financial 
Stability Board to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,” (17 
February 2014). Available at: 
https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_140222.pdf.  
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THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS TAKES TBTF CENTRE-
STAGE 
The idea that some financial institutions are too-big-to-fail and must be 
kept operating has been a widely accepted element of central banking 
lore since the rescue of Continental Illinois Bank in 1984: a single 
troubled bank which could be rescued by prompt action, without long-
term consequences for the financial sector. Until 2008 the consensus 
view was that TBTF would be confined to banks and would be very rare. 
Potential runs on banks could be checked by depositor insurance 
(explicit or implicit); provision of special liquidity would cover temporary 
liquidity problems in the way envisaged a century earlier by Bagehot; 
and bank failure could be softened by arranged mergers with stronger 
banks. If worst came to worst, lender of last resort (LoLR) measures 
could be used, drawing on public funds. It was envisaged that LoLR 
would be so rarely used (and in such limited amount) that the moral 
hazard issues that it raised could be held in check with constructive 
ambiguity. System-wide crises (such as the 1997-98 Asian crisis) were 
beyond the focus of policy-makers in the mature economies.  
The 2008 crisis changed all that. This issue is now seen as so important 
that the post-2008 discussion has been in terms of how the TBTF 
problem could be solved, usually expressed in terms of ‘ending TBTF’. 
The Head of the BIS Monetary and Economics Department calls this 
“the single most important policy issue that has emerged from the 
crisis”.4  
2008 demonstrated that TBTF was not just about size: institutions could 
also be too important, too interconnected, or too vital in their function to 
be allowed to fail.5 A widely shared judgment is that allowing for the 
failure of Lehman Brothers was a serious policy error. Until AIG’s rescue, 
the common view was that insurance companies might become 
insolvent, but this would be a gradual process without systemic 
implications. But the impact of failure extended beyond individual 
institutions: much of the disruption in 2008 was caused by the freezing of 
funding markets (such as the mortgage-backed security market and the 
New York money market mutual funds). The idea that non-banks would 
be rescued at the public’s expense, and the perceived need to keep 
some financial markets going through active official support, were 
entirely novel propositions. 
 
                                                
4 Stephen Cecchetti, “How to Cope with the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem?” (paper presented 
at the 10th Annual Conference of the International Association of Deposit Insurers, 
"Beyond the Crisis: The Need for a Strengthened Financial Stability Framework", 
Warsaw, Poland, 19 October 2011). Available at: 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp111019.htm.  
5 Long Term Capital Management provided an earlier (1998) example of a non-bank 
being saved by official intervention, even if there was no official money involved. 
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Despite measures already taken to reduce the TBTF problem, it has 
very probably become worse since 2008 in two main ways. First, there 
has been a great deal of consolidation within the financial sector.6 
Second, the traditionally ‘constructive ambiguity’ about whether banks 
would in fact be rescued has become far less ambiguous. It is now clear 
that many banks will be rescued, as will some non-banks, some non-
insured creditors and some financial market infrastructure. The likelihood 
of a TBTF event has probably been reduced by the measures taken 
since 2008, but the impact if one did in fact occur is almost certainly 
much greater. 
 
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?  
There are two (closely related) aspects. First, there are distortions to 
markets and the decision-making processes within financial firms that 
arise from the implicit subsidies to institutions that have the benefit of 
the TBTF safety net. Second, there are externalities when TBTF 
threatens to induce a systemic collapse within the financial sector that 
has an impact on the real economy. 
The implicit subsidy (de facto insurance of liabilities over and above 
deposit insurance) distorts risk assessment, creates moral hazard and 
lowers the cost of funding for favoured institutions, fostering the 
excessive and risky expansion of balance sheets. Market discipline and 
risk control processes are undermined.7 The financial sector becomes 
larger than it should, such that the competitive playing field becomes 
more uneven and systemic crisis more likely. Where the protection is 
explicit (as with the systemically important banks – SIBs), this gives an 
unfair competitive advantage over non-SIB banks.8 
The extreme form of externality (demonstrated in 2008) is represented 
by the threat of systemic collapse. As the global financial crisis showed, 
a systemic collapse freezes markets, impedes credit flows, and 
undermines general confidence, causing unnecessary declines in asset 
prices and adverse cyclical movements. Countering the real impact of a 
                                                
6 See Chapter 3 in IMF, “Global Financial Stability Report: Moving from Liquidity- to 
Growth-Driven Markets,” (Washington DC, April 2014). Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2014/01/pdf/text.pdf.  
7 Moral hazard is generally high on the list of concerns, but in practice it probably played 
a minor role in 2008. While excessive risk-taking was clearly an important factor, its 
motivation is found elsewhere: ignorance or underestimation of risk, commercial 
pressures and the threat of take-over (and loss of management position) drove 
management further out on the risk spectrum. 
8 Even where the protection is implicit, these same distortions apply to some degree. 
For estimates of the implicit cost, see IMF, “Global Financial Stability Report: Moving 
from Liquidity- to Growth-Driven Markets.” 
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system-wide failure in the financial sector can require substantial public 
funds. 
The subsidy element might be addressed, Pareto-style, by some kind 
of offsetting tax – an implicit premium for the insurance aspect of TBTF. 
Setting this premium optimally would be a challenge and would not 
remove the moral hazard aspects. Yet this consideration might at least 
justify imposing some cost-increasing measures (such as extra capital 
requirements) on institutions that benefit from the implicit subsidy. Extra 
capital is not the equivalent of paying an explicit premium for protection, 
but it would offset some of the distortion and reduce the probability of 
failure. 
The starting point in thinking about the externality issues is to recognise 
just how costly a systemic financial crisis is to society – demonstrated by 
the long-lived damage following 2008. In terms of societal priorities, the 
worst outcome is collapse. The second-worst is the cost of ex-post crisis 
containment, such as the diversion of public resources towards handling 
an unfolding crisis, and the expense involved in keeping the financial 
system afloat.9 A least-cost strategy would involve well-designed ex-ante 
policy measures that make a systemic crisis less common and which 
limit its costs if it does occur. Again, the recognition of this potentially 
very damaging externality of systemic failure does, in itself, justify 
imposing cost-increasing measures on financial sector institutions. It is 
also a justification for being ready to fund a crisis rescue operation.  
 
POSSIBLE REMEDIES10  
The IMF categorises the solutions to the TBTF dilemma into four 
interconnected groupings: 
• Reduce the size, complexity and interconnectedness that are the 
characteristics of SIBs 
                                                
9 As the former chair of the US Federal Reserve noted: “In the midst of the crisis, 
providing support to a too-big-to-fail firm usually represents the best of bad alternatives; 
without such support there could be substantial damage to the economy”, see: Ben S. 
Bernanke, “Causes of the Recent Financial and Economic Crisis, Testimony before the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,” (Washington DC, 2 September 2010). Available 
at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20100902a.htm. 
10 Purists might suggest that the first best solution would be for governments to make 
irrevocable commitments not to save financial institutions. This can be dismissed 
quickly because of time inconsistency problems. Here is Ben Bernanke’s view: 
“Simple declarations that the government will not assist firms in the future, or restrictions 
that make providing assistance more difficult, will not be credible on their own. Few 
governments will accept devastating economic costs if a rescue can be conducted at a 
lesser cost; even if one Administration refrained from rescuing a large, complex firm, 
market participants would believe that others might not refrain in the future. Thus, a 
promise not to intervene in and of itself will not solve the problem”, see: ibid.	
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• Make failure less likely 
• Reduce the probability of bail-out 
• Minimise the amount of public funds used 
 
WHAT INSTRUMENTS ARE AVAILABLE?11 
• Make financial institutions smaller, less connected and less complex 
• More capital, including contingent capital  
• More loss-absorbing funding, mainly from non-insured creditors 
• Better supervision 
• Better resolution (mergers, living wills) 
• Market improvements, such as a greater role for central 
counterparties or additional capital requirements for transactions 
involving over-the-counter (OTC) securities 
 
REDUCE SIZE, COMPLEXITY AND CONNECTEDNESS  
There are a variety of approaches here that attempt to reduce 
complexity and interconnectedness. The Volcker Rule aims to remove 
proprietary trading from the TBTF balance sheet. Ring fencing (in the UK 
and Europe) has the same objective, in trying to push some potential 
losses out of the insured umbrella. Time will tell if the separation can be 
effectively maintained. The ability of institutions to shift risky and failing 
assets into the protected balance sheet will undermine the effectiveness 
of these reforms. These measures seem, at best, a partial and minimal 
response to the problem: to require institutions to shift clearly non-
systemic activities such as proprietary trading out from under the 
taxpayers’ protective umbrella seems a modest response indeed. As 
well, of course, the TBTF institutions, while smaller and perhaps fewer in 
number, will still be at risk. 
 
                                                
11 See box 3.5 in IMF, “Global Financial Stability Report: Moving from Liquidity- to 
Growth-Driven Markets.” 
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MORE CAPITAL, INCLUDING CONTINGENT CAPITAL 
AND MORE LOSS-ABSORPTION FUNDS 
More loss-absorbing capital clearly addresses the externality issues, and 
if the requirement is in fact more than the bank would hold voluntarily, 
this is some offset to the implicit subsidy. The banks (individually and 
through the Institute for International Finance)12 have argued that the 
cost of this extra capital is painfully high, while the BIS calculations see 
the cost as more modest.13 Whatever the outcome (and it is bound to be 
a compromise), extra capital reduces the issue of TBTF, but does not 
end it.  
There has been much interest in contingent capital, to create more loss-
absorption funds. The question will be whether in practice the contingent 
funds will be available when needed, or whether it will turn out that the 
holders will be protected in the way that Irish bond-holders were 
protected by ex-post guarantee, for political or consumer-protection 
reasons.14 The lesson here may be that while there are in theory 
creditors who could contribute much to a failing institution, there are 
serious legal difficulties in forcing them to contribute, short of bankruptcy.  
 
BETTER RESOLUTION, MORE INTENSE AND 
EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION 
The issues involved in more intensive supervision are clear enough: the 
more that is done, the greater the costs (both to the supervisors and the 
banks). There will be an optimal amount of reform that will still leave the 
possibility of TBTF. Nevertheless, good resolution procedures would 
avoid disorderly liquidation of the institution while ensuring that the costs 
of restructure are borne by the existing shareholders and uninsured 
creditors. The prospect of a bail-out would also be less likely, with a bank 
being closed down in an orderly manner before substantively harming 
the viability of others. The success of such procedures would be more 
likely if accompanied by the introduction of comprehensive high-
coverage deposit insurance, ‘living wills’ and well-practiced resolutions 
processes and laws.15 Bailing-in uninsured creditors would provide an 
                                                
12 Institute of International Finance, “Specific Impacts of Regulatory Change on End-
Users: Initial Report,” (Washington DC, October 2012). Available at: 
http://www.iif.com/download.php?id=2JpvK6/xpMA=. 
13 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “An Assessment of the Long-Term 
Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements,” (Basel, August 
2010). Available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf. 
14 Stefan Avdjiev, Anastasia Kartasheva, and Bilyana Bogdanova, “Cocos: A Primer,” 
BIS Quarterly Review September (2013). 
15 For a sceptical view on how this would work in practice, see Mark Thoma, “Too Much 
"Too Big to Fail"?,” Economist's View(2010), 
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2010/09/too-much-too-big-to-
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additional major source of rescue funds, if it could be made possible.16 
Swift resolution is hard to do with complex institutions that have a high 
level of connectivity with domestic and external jurisdictions and that 
provide international transactional services. 
 
STRENGTHENING CORE MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 
This section points to specific measures that would require more OTC 
transactions be shifted to central-counterparty (CCPs) exchanges. 
However, these central counterparties create their own systemic risks 
and would need close supervision. An alternative to CCPs would be 
regulating for firms to adopt greater capital requirements and larger 
trading margins. Standards on these issues have been developed by the 
BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the 
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) covering financial market infrastructure.17 
 
WHY EX-ANTE MEASURES ARE RESISTED 
Such ex-ante measures, however, will be resisted by the financial 
sector.18 The subsidy element will not be acknowledged as valuable: 
each institution will say that its balance sheet is safe, and that its 
cheaper funding and better credit ratings come from its own superior risk 
management and conservatism. The implicit protection to uninsured 
creditors and shareholders is not a simple case of insurance (like fire or 
life insurance), where the value of the insurance could be estimated and 
internalised through a tax or charge. Successful crisis avoidance does 
not compensate the insured after the crisis event: the event does not 
occur. Externalities, by definition, are not the concern of the institution 
causing them: paying for adverse externalities is always and everywhere 
resisted.  
                                                                                                       
fail.html; The year 2008 provided various examples of how corporate law can inhibit the 
speedy resolution of failing firms, such as in the possible Barclay’s bid for Lehmans, the 
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch transaction, and the de-listing of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. 
16 Paul Melaschenko and Noel Reynolds, “A Template for Recapitalising Too-Big-to-Fail 
Banks,” BIS Quarterly Review September (2013). 
17 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical Committee of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, “Principles for Financial Market 
Infrastructures,” (Basel, April 2012). Available at: http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf. 
18 See the discussion in Raghuram Rajan, “Too Systemic to Fail: Consequences, 
Causes, and Potential Remedies” (paper presented at the Eighth BIS Annual 
Conference, Basel, 25-26 June 2009). Available at: 
http://www.bis.org/events/conf090625/rajanpaper1.pdf. Rajan: “If there is one lesson we 
take away from this crisis, it should be this – regulation that the regulated perceive as 
extremely costly is unlikely to be effective, and is likely to be most weakened at the 
point of maximum danger to the system”. 
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Crises are rare, and their cost fades in memory, including in that of 
policy-makers. It is easy for the financial sector to argue that they do not 
need the measures, or need far less than is optimal from society’s 
viewpoint. They can also argue that in general, other rare adverse 
events are met ex-post from general revenue. Financial sector 
resistance has to be weighed against the unfairness to the general 
public in having to rescue the financial sector in the event of a crisis. 
Developing an appropriate balance is a policy challenge. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The promise to end TBTF is a bold one: the FSB Report to the G20 on 
TBTF says “the policy initiative to end TBTF is ambitious, but 
necessary”.19  
If the measures explored here did no more than offset the implicit 
subsidy and compensated for the externalities, it might be argued that 
something closer to Pareto-optimality had been achieved. It is, however, 
too much to ask that the measures taken, with TBTF in mind, will 
perform the offsetting role with any precision. The most that can be said 
with confidence is that these efforts seem well justified and that the 
counter-arguments made by the financial sector, understandable though 
they are, should be answered with the simple logic that the heavy costs 
of TBTF and the disruption to the economy have been amply 
demonstrated.  
This is as much about politics as the development of optimal 
intervention. Vested interests have been well represented (many would 
say over-represented) both in the setting of regulations prior to 2008 and 
the reforms since then. The public interest has often been less 
adequately represented. If a sensible point on the spectrum is to be 
achieved, there is a need to rebalance the debate, giving more voice to 
the general interest and less to the debate within the financial industry. 
If intervention did succeed in balancing the implicit subsidy and the 
externalities, the problem of TBTF would be reduced, but not ended. 
Systemically important banks could still require public funds to remain 
open. In any case, the emphasis on SIBs misses a key lesson from 
2008: that systemic issues will occur in institutions and markets that had 
not been seen, ex-ante, as potentially systemic.20 The more measures 
                                                
19 Financial Stability Board, “Progress and Next Steps Towards Ending "Too-Big-to-Fail" 
(TBTF): Report of the Financial Stability Board to the G-20,” (2 September 2013). 
Available at: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130902.pdf. 
20 “All of this implies that the crucial problem is not the fiscal cost of rescue, but the 
macroeconomic volatility induced by precarious credit supply – first provided too easily 
and at too low a price, and then severely restricted. And it is possible – indeed, I 
suspect likely – that such credit-supply problems would exist even if the too-big-to-fail 
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which are taken to reduce TBTF problems in SIBs, the greater the 
probability that the problems have just been shifted into parts of the 
financial sector outside these measures (in particular, into the shadow 
banking sector), where they remain systemic but hidden until the crisis 
arrives.  
Moreover, financial market participants have powerful reasons to widen 
the scope of protection, to their own advantage, once the crisis arrives. 
When Greek bonds came under pressure in 2010, financial markets 
quickly broadened the threat of bond-market collapse to other fragile 
countries in the European periphery, ultimately requiring the ECB to 
promise to do ‘whatever it takes’ to hold the euro together, at some 
considerable risk to the public purse. In such a situation any measures 
that are considered to be acceptable before the crisis will be found to be 
inadequate in scope once the crisis is underway, with coverage widened 
ex-post. 
The last word on the prospect of ending TBTF might be left to William 
Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global 
Financial System: 
“We have made some progress on the TBTF problem, 
particularly in reducing the likelihood that a large complex firm 
will reach the point of distress at which society faces serious 
costs. But we have a considerable ways to go to finish the job 
and reduce to tolerable levels the social costs associated with 
such failures.”21 
The challenge the G20 faces is not to definitively end TBTF, but to lend 
its weight to establishing a sensible trade-off between reducing the ex-
post cost of TBTF while minimising the ex-ante costs of doing so.
                                                                                                       
problem were effectively addressed”, from Adair Turner, “Too Much "Too Big to Fail"?,” 
Project Syndicate (2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/too-much--too-
big-to-fail--. 
21 William C. Dudley, “Solving the Too Big to Fail Problem” (paper presented at the 
Clearing House’s Second Annual Business Meeting and Conference, New York, 15 
November 2012). Available at: http://www.bis.org/review/r121116c.pdf?frames=0. 
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THE G20 AND BASE EROSION 
AND PROFIT SHIFTING: SOME 
LONGER-TERM 
CONSIDERATIONS 
MIKE CALLAGHAN1 
INTRODUCTION 
Combating tax evasion and avoidance is a priority for the G20. A 
particular focus of the G20 is profit shifting and aggressive tax planning 
by multinational firms, described by the OECD as the need to address 
base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). This paper provides some 
observations on the work program of the OECD/G20 BEPS project, and 
highlights the importance of seeing this initiative as part of a long-term 
challenge to ensure international tax laws keep pace with an increasingly 
globalised business environment. It suggests that greater weight should 
be placed on transparency in order to reduce aggressive tax planning 
strategies by corporates. It also proposes that a potentially major change 
in the governance arrangements for dealing with international tax issues 
has begun, in that the BEPS work includes G20 non-OECD members 
participating on an equal basis with OECD members. This cannot stop 
when the current BEPS timetable ends in September 2015. Moreover, 
improved arrangements are now required to foster greater direct 
participation of developing countries in the BEPS project. Australia 
should use its position as G20 chair in 2014 to ensure that the BEPS 
project is part of a permanent improvement in the processes for dealing 
with international tax issues. 
 
BEPS IS A PRIORITY FOR THE G20 
Australia has indicated that in 2014 the G20 is committed to international 
tax cooperation. To protect the integrity of national tax systems, the 
G20’s work is focused on three related areas:2 
• Addressing tax avoidance, particularly BEPS, to ensure profits are 
taxed in the location where the economic activity takes place 
                                                
1 Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 Australian G20 Presidency, “Tax,” 2014. Available at: 
https://www.g20.org/g20_priorities/g20_2014_agenda/tax. 
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• Promoting international tax transparency and the global sharing of 
information so that taxpayers with offshore investments comply with 
their domestic tax obligations 
• Ensuring that developing countries benefit from the G20’s tax 
agenda, particularly in relation to information sharing	
BEPS essentially refers to corporates artificially exploiting loopholes in 
different countries’ tax laws to reduce or avoid taxation. In particular, it 
covers the capacity of multinational corporations to shift profits to 
locations where there is little or no taxation. BEPS can result in situations 
where there is ‘double non-taxation’. 
In July 2013, the OECD released a fifteen-point Action Plan, focused on 
addressing BEPS.3 It also established a timetable for the completion of 
its actions, with a number of action-points to be finalised by September 
2014 and the remainder to be completed by September 2015. As the 
OECD noted, this Action Plan was produced at the request of the G20. 
At the St Petersburg Summit in September 2013, G20 leaders endorsed 
the BEPS Action Plan and welcomed the establishment of a G20/OECD 
BEPS project.4  
 
A TURBOCHARGED WORK PROGRAM 
The OECD has ‘turbocharged’ its work on international tax issues in 
order to meet the deliverables established in its Action Plan. The project 
is ambitious, for as stated by the OECD, “This Action Plan calls for 
fundamental changes to the current mechanisms and the adoption of 
new consensus-based approaches, including anti-abuse provisions, 
designed to prevent and counter base erosion and profit shifting”.5 Since 
January 2014, the OECD has released discussion drafts covering: Tax 
Challenges of the Digital Economy; Transfer Pricing Documentation and 
Country-by-Country Reporting; Preventing the Granting of Treaty 
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances; and the neutralisation of the 
effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements.6 The OECD has invited public 
                                                
3 OECD, “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,” (Paris, 2013). 
4 G20, “G20 Leaders' Declaration, St Petersburg,” (6 September 2013). Available at: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html. 
5 OECD, “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.” 
6 “Release of Discussion Draft on Action 1 (Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy) of 
the BEPS Action Plan,” 24 March 2014. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/discussion-draft-action-1-tax-challenges-digital-economy.htm; 
“Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting 
Released for Public Comment,” 30 January 2014. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/discussion-draft-transfer-pricing-
documentation.htm; “Release of Discussion Draft on Action 6 (Prevent Treaty Abuse) of 
the BEPS Action Plan,” 13 March 2014. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/discussion-draft-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.htm; 
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comments on its discussion drafts and, notwithstanding a short (few 
weeks) deadline for comments, it has received thousands of pages of 
comments from businesses, business associations, law firms, 
accounting organisations from developed economies, and a few 
contributions from NGOs.7  
Not surprisingly, a common reaction in the responses is concern over 
the very short period for consultation. For example, included in PwC’s 
comments on the OECD’s Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing 
Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting was this concern: 
We recognise the legitimate desire of tax authorities in 
jurisdictions around the world to have access to relevant tax 
reporting information … We’re concerned though with the speed 
with which these proposals are being developed. We 
commended the OECD’s efforts to engage business input, but 
we are concerned that the timing of this proposal will not permit 
sufficient opportunity for input from, and consultation with, the 
business community to ensure that the guidance ultimately 
adopted can be successfully implemented in practice. 
The rapid pace of the OECD’s work on BEPS is dictated by its ambitious 
timetable. It is committed to completing the action items targeted for 
September 2014, in time for consideration by G20 finance ministers at 
their meeting scheduled for 20-21 September 2014. G20 finance 
ministers have in turn set a high bar for what is to be achieved on the 
BEPS agenda in 2014. At their meeting in February 2014, they stated 
that “[b]y the Brisbane Summit, we will start to deliver effective, practical 
and sustained measures to counter BEPS across all industries, including 
traditional, digital, and digitalised firms in an increasingly globalised 
economy”.8 
 
 
                                                                                                       
“Release of Discussion Drafts on Action 2 (Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements) of the BEPS Action Plan,” 19 March 2014. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/discussion-drafts-action-2-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements.htm. 
7 Oxfam, “Business among Friends: Why Corporate Tax Dodgers Are Not yet Losing 
Sleep Over Global Tax Reform,” (May 2014). Available at: 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp185-business-among-friends-
corporate-tax-reform-120514-en_0.pdf. 
8 G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014,” (Sydney, 23 February 2014). 
Available at: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-0223-finance.html. 
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EXPECTATIONS AS TO WHAT WILL BE DELIVERED 
VARY 
Expectations as to what the BEPS project will achieve vary significantly. 
When the OECD launched the BEPS initiative in 2013, there were a 
number of comments that this work would drastically change 
international tax arrangements. For example, some of the comments 
included; “it is the most significant potential change to international 
taxation for decades”, it represents a “potential seismic shift in 
international tax”, and it was a “reboot for the 21st century”.9  
In contrast to these high expectations, there are a number of sceptics 
who question whether the BEPS exercise will deliver substantive 
changes. Nathan Boidman and Michael Kandev conclude that the BEPS 
exercise is unlikely to lead to large-scale coordinated changes to the 
substantive rules and principles in international taxation, although 
“procedural changes are expected to continue apace resulting in ever 
greater and more burdensome tax disclosure requirements on 
multilateral enterprises”.10 Richard Murphy is also pessimistic and sees 
the BEPS project as only “tinkering with the existing system” and that it 
will not deliver the desired outcomes.11 In the area of treaty abuse, one 
commentator notes “even absent the advent of the BEPS initiative, 
governments and the OECD have been ‘all over’ this area and it is 
difficult to see what the action plan will really add up to”.12 OXFAM has 
focused on the implications of BEPS for developing countries and while 
it initially saw the G20/OECD project as a unique opportunity to reform 
corporate tax rules for the benefit of developing countries, has recently 
expressed concern that there is a “huge risk” that any changes that are 
achieved will only serve the interests of developed countries.13 
 
BEPS – SOME CONTRADICTIONS 
So where is the BEPS exercise heading? Will it bring international tax 
rules into the twenty-first century, comprehensively deal with corporate 
tax evasion and avoidance and result in a significant increase in 
                                                
9 Mike Callaghan and Marty Harris, “Reforming International Taxation: The Role of the 
G20,” in G20 Monitor No. 6: Tax, Infrastructure, Anti-Corruption, Energy and the G20 
(G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013). 
10 Michael N. Kandev and Nathan Boidman, “BEPS: The OECD Discovers America?,” 
The IBSA Knowledge Bank (2014), http://www.istructuring.com/knowledge/article/beps-
the-oecd-discovers-america/?country=15. 
11 Richard Murphy, “Is BEPS the End of the Line for the OECD Taxation Model?,” Tax 
Research UK (2014), http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2014/04/22/is-beps-the-end-
of-the-line-for-the-oecd-taxation-model/. 
12 Kandev and Boidman, “BEPS: The OECD Discovers America?”. 
13 Oxfam, “Business among Friends: Why Corporate Tax Dodgers Are Not yet Losing 
Sleep Over Global Tax Reform.” 
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government revenue? Or will it disappoint, involve little substantial 
progress in combating BEPS, other than imposing significant reporting 
burdens on firms and potentially impacting on legitimate economic 
activity? 
To gain an overview of how the BEPS project is unfolding, it is 
worthwhile to step back from the detail of the issues and seek to identify 
some general impressions. One theme or impression that comes from 
reading the comments and materials produced by the OECD and G20, 
and comparing this with the comments received from the public, is the 
existence of ‘contradictions’. This may be a harsh assessment, and 
could be expressed as a comment on the overall complexity of the task, 
but nevertheless there are a number of contradictory themes running 
through the BEPS work that will influence where this exercise is heading. 
 
IS BEPS A NEW OR OLD ISSUE? 
One contradiction is whether BEPS is dealing with a relatively new or a 
well-known issue. The public may well think that the issue of corporates 
shifting their profits to low-tax jurisdictions is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Over the past few years it has been a prominent issue on 
the G8 and the G20 agendas and, as noted previously, the OECD is in 
the middle of an ambitious and rushed work program to address the 
integrity of countries’ tax bases. But as is evident from the comments 
received on the BEPS discussion drafts circulated by the OECD, the 
issues being reviewed have been around and on the OECD work 
program for a long time. In fact, many of the elements being discussed 
have probably been in play in one form or another since income tax was 
invented.  
The extent to which the issues are well known is highlighted in the 
OECD’s work on addressing tax challenges of the digital economy. 
Newcomers to the debate might have the impression that issues 
associated with BEPS are intrinsically related to the rise of the digital 
economy. This would have been reinforced by the high-profile cases that 
have been publicly associated with BEPS, such as those involving major 
information technology firms Google and Apple. However, as noted in 
the discussion paper on the digital economy, one of the resources that 
the OECD drew upon was the outcomes of the 1998 Ottawa Ministerial 
Conference on Electronic Commerce, where ministers welcomed the 
1998 Committee of Financial Affairs Report ‘Electronic Commerce 
Taxation Framework’.14 Moreover, the BEPS Task Force on the digital 
economy considered that these 1998 principles were still relevant 
                                                
14 OECD, “Release of Discussion Draft on Action 1 (Tax Challenges of the Digital 
Economy) of the BEPS Action Plan”. 
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enough to serve as a basis for evaluating contemporary options to 
address challenges posed by the digital economy. The OECD also 
discussed the post-Ottawa body of work on tax and the digital economy. 
In short, the tax challenges that have emerged around the growing 
digital economy were not discovered simply because of the recent 
publicity over the tax minimisation strategies employed by firms like 
Google and Apple. 
It is also telling that while digital firms have been singled out for criticism 
with regards to their navigation of international tax rules, the conclusion 
of the OECD was that tax issues involving the sale of digitised products 
and services by non-resident sellers are not unique to the digital 
economy. Rather, tax issues borne from the sales of physical goods and 
other transactions between non-resident providers and consumers that 
are located in a jurisdiction where the provider has no physical presence 
suffer from the same challenges. As such, from an income tax 
perspective, the digital economy does not appear to raise specific new 
issues. Rather, advances in information and communication technology 
have made direct interactions between providers and consumers in 
different locations more extensive and efficient. Thus, the OECD 
concludes that there should not be a separate tax regime for the digital 
economy. While most of the comments received by the OECD on the 
discussion draft endorse these conclusions, many suggest that there are 
contradictions in the draft, for it goes on to pose a number of specific 
measures for digital firms, such as the introduction of withholding taxes, 
and virtual permanent establishment options. 
There is a perception that BEPS was placed on the G20 agenda at the 
Los Cabos Summit, where leaders stated: “We reiterate the need to 
prevent base erosion and profit shifting and we will follow with attention 
the ongoing work of the OECD in this area”.15 However, issues 
surrounding base erosion and profit shifting were on the G20 agenda 
well before Los Cabos. At the Seoul Summit, reference was made to the 
importance of strengthening tax regimes, countering the erosion of tax 
bases and ways to tax multinationals through effective transfer pricing.16 
But this was all in relation to developing countries and was part of the 
Seoul Development Consensus. BEPS only became a high priority on 
the G20 agenda following the publicity around the tax positions of such 
companies as Google, Amazon and Starbucks, who earn large amounts 
of revenue in developed countries, but through the use of devices, such 
as the infamous ‘Double Irish Dutch Sandwich’, have very low effective 
tax rates. Concern over such outcomes became a major political issue in 
advanced economies, not least because many countries were in the 
                                                
15 G20, “G-20 Leaders Los Cabos Declaration,” 2012. Available at: 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html. 
16 “Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth,” (Seoul, 11-12 November 2010). 
Available at: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-consensus.pdf. 
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process of implementing tough fiscal consolidation measures. It is not 
good politics to be cutting back on the provision of public goods and 
services or increasing personal income tax rates when the headlines are 
pointing to multinational corporations that appear to pay relatively little 
tax. 
Hence, in 2013 dealing with corporate tax evasion and profit shifting 
became a political priority for the G8 and the G20. As The Economist 
reported in its coverage of the G8 summit hosted by the United Kingdom 
in June 2013, “Publicity over the low taxes paid on foreign profits by 
American multinationals such as Apple, Google and Starbucks has 
propelled tackling tax avoidance up the political agenda in the G8”.17 The 
same story played out in the G20. Again, what was new was not 
awareness that multinationals were using devices to lower their effective 
tax rates, but the publicity of the extent of this practice by high-profile 
firms.  
 
THE SCALE OF THE BEPS PROBLEM 
Another area where there is an impression of ‘contradiction’ is over the 
scale of the problem of base erosion and profit shifting. The OECD 
suggests that the revenue at stake is very substantial. For example, the 
Declaration on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting adopted by the OECD 
Ministerial Council on 29 May 2013 states that BEPS “constitutes a 
serious risk to tax revenues, tax sovereignty and trust in the integrity of 
tax systems of all countries”, while ministers declared that “there is a 
pressing need to address BEPS and to work towards level playing 
fields”.18 
Others, in contrast, argue BEPS it not as significant as believed. 
Clemens Fuest and others from ZEW Mannheim and the University of 
Mannheim, for example, conclude that while there is evidence that profit 
shifting takes place, there is no precise and reliable estimate for the 
amount of tax base erosion that occurs due to international profit 
shifting.19 They note that there are a small number of rather rough 
estimates, and while their results receive great attention in public 
debates, they have to be treated with caution due to serious 
methodological flaws. In addition, Hosuk lee-Makiyama and Bert 
                                                
17 The Economist, “The G8 Pledges to Tackle the "Three Ts",” (2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21579860-g8-pledges-tackle-
three-ts-t-time. 
18 Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, “Declaration on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting,” (Paris, 29 May 2013). Available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/C-
MIN(2013)22-FINAL-ENG.pdf. 
19 Clemens Fuest et al., “Profit Shifting and ‘Aggressive’ Tax Planning by Multinational 
Firms: Issues and Options for Reform,” (July 2013). Available at: 
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13044.pdf. 
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Verschelde from the European Centre for International Political Economy 
suggest that BEPS may be fixing a non-existing problem.20 The 
impression from many of the comments that the OECD has received on 
its discussion drafts also suggests that BEPS is not such a significant 
problem – the bigger problem is that many of the measures being 
considered will be costly and will impede legitimate business activities. 
The concern raised in many comments is that the BEPS agenda will 
lead to a case of double taxation rather than double non-taxation, where 
double taxation has a greater potential to adversely affect the global 
economy. In short, the BEPS ‘cure’ could be worse than the disease. 
Given the uncertainty of the magnitude of the problem, it is surprising 
that item 11 of the OECD’s Action Plan, namely developing an economic 
analysis of the scale and impact of BEPS and the actions to address it, 
is not scheduled to be completed until September 2015. However, when 
the time comes to implement measures to deal with BEPS, particularly 
any that are resisted by the private sector, national authorities will have 
to have a firm estimate of the revenue at risk. It is also unusual that an 
assessment of the economic effect of the measures to deal with BEPS is 
one of the last action items being progressed. Given that many of the 
comments received by the OECD emphasise that the proposals will 
impede legitimate economic activity, and cover transactions that are not 
motivated by attempts to reduce tax, an assessment of the economic 
consequences of the actions being considered should be undertaken at 
every step of the project. This was recognised in a ‘BEPS Action Plan 
Update’ provided by Mark Konza from the Australian Taxation Office.21 
For example, in commenting on the work on hybrid mismatch 
arrangements, Konza observed it is important that any hybrid mismatch 
rules applied by Australia should not apply to ‘unintended mismatches’, 
that is, those which are not aimed at achieving a tax advantage. In 
making the case for implementing any recommendations coming from 
the BEPS project, national authorities will have to demonstrate that the 
revenue gained outweighs the costs, including the cost of any impact on 
economic activity. 
 
WHOSE TAX BASE IS BEING PROTECTED? 
Another contradiction underlying the BEPS exercise is around the 
question of ‘whose tax base is being protected’? Is it the source country, 
the resident country, or is it the case that there is no tax base to protect? 
                                                
20 Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Bert Verschelde, “OECD BEPS: Reconciling Global Trade, 
Taxation Principles and the Digital Economy,” ECIPE Occasional Paper 4 (2014). 
21 Mark Konza, “BEPS Action Plan Update” (paper presented at the Tax Institute NSW 
7th Annual Tax Forum, Dalton House Sydney, 22 May 2014). Available at: 
https://www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/Speeches/Other/BEPS-Action-Plan-Update/. 
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If BEPS is going to restore taxing rights, those rights will have to be 
allocated to either the source or resident country. In the preamble to its 
Action Plan, the OECD says that it will restore both source and resident 
taxation in a number of cases where cross-border income would 
otherwise go untaxed or would be taxed at very low rates, but it will not 
be seeking to change existing international standards on the allocation of 
taxing rights on cross-border income. However, many of the comments 
made on the discussion drafts released by the OECD suggest that the 
measures are seeking to alter residence-source tax concepts. For 
example, the comments from the Business Industry and Advisory 
Committee to the OECD (BIAC) on the discussion draft dealing with the 
digital economy state: 
in keeping with the publicly stated parameters of the project, we 
do not believe this paper is the place to consider ‘source’ vs 
‘residence’ issues. That is clearly an issue of concern to G20 
and OECD members, but if that discussion is to happen, it 
needs to take place more broadly and more deliberatively than 
can be done in this paper.22 
The issue is whether it is possible to address BEPS without revisiting the 
source vs residence debate. The work by Clemens Fuest and others 
from the University of Mannheim observes that the policies for tackling 
profit shifting and tax avoidance can be divided into four starting 
positions:23 
• Extension of residence taxation 
• Extension of source taxation 
• Fundamental reforms of corporate taxation 
• Stricter reporting and transparency requirements 
Focusing on the first two approaches, there will be revenue implications 
for countries depending on whether the approach is taken to strengthen 
residence taxation or source taxation. For example, the authors note that 
one approach is to extend residence taxation by tightening controlled 
foreign company (CFC) rules so that they effectively prevent sheltering 
passive low-taxed royalty or interest income from residence taxation. 
However, they go on to note that not all countries might be willing to 
implement such changes, because while some countries lose as a result 
of profit shifting and base erosion, other countries gain. They note:  
                                                
22 For BIAC’s comments on OECD Discussion Draft on Action1, see: OECD, 
“Comments Received on Discussion Draft on Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy 
Published,” 16 April 2104. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/comments-action-1-tax-
challenges-digital-economy.htm. 
23 Fuest et al., “Profit Shifting and ‘Aggressive’ Tax Planning by Multinational Firms: 
Issues and Options for Reform.” 
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It is for example not in the interest of the US to tighten CFC 
rules or the rules for tax residence because US multinational 
firms would then lose the competitive advantage of avoiding 
European corporate income taxes on foreign income.24 
A second approach to addressing BEPS is through strengthening source 
taxation. This could be through imposing a withholding tax on interest 
and royalty payments which, in order to prevent double taxation, would 
be creditable in the residence country. While this would be consistent 
with the existing resident and source country concepts, it would likely be 
controversial for it would be seen as strengthening the source country 
tax base at the expense of the resident country. 
 
IS MORE ‘OUT OF THE BOX’ THINKING REQUIRED? 
This raises another contradiction in the BEPS exercise, and that is 
whether the work on BEPS is capturing the ‘out of the box’ thinking that 
the OECD signalled would be required in its February 2013 report on the 
issue.25 The scope for out of the box thinking appears to be limited by 
the constraints that have been placed on the project. As already noted, 
the OECD has signalled that this exercise will not consider changes to 
source versus residence tax concepts. It also remains wedded to the 
arm’s length principle for dealing with intra-firm transactions. Such 
concepts as formulary apportionment, whereby a multinational’s profit 
would be allocated to each jurisdiction, based on such factors as the 
proportion of sales, assets or payroll in each jurisdiction, is ruled out. 
Kartikeya Singh and Aparna Mathur point out, however, that many of the 
positions adopted by the OECD resemble formulary apportionment.26 
For example, they note that: 
• There is an overarching emphasis on ‘economic activity’ as the 
primary determinant of where income should be taxed, and economic 
activity is associated with such easily measurable indicators as 
U8employment, physical assets and sales  
• The role of risks and intangible assets, which are hard to measure, is 
de-emphasised  
• There are references to anti-abuse provisions and measures that go 
beyond the arm’s length principle with the objective of implementing 
an income allocation that is closely tied to economic activity 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 OECD, “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,” (Paris, 12 February 2013). 
26 Aparna Mathur and Kartikeya Singh, “BEPS and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences,” (2013), http://www.aei.org/article/economics/fiscal-policy/taxes/beps-
and-the-law-of-unintended-consequences/./ 
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A possible consequence of the approach being pursued by the OECD to 
strengthen the link between tax and economic activity on a de-facto 
formulary basis is that economic activity will be even more sensitive to 
tax rates. Specifically, tax competition may increase. 
The IMF notes that there is considerable interest among civil society 
organisations and others in more radical alternatives to the current 
international tax framework, such as formulary apportionment and some 
form of minimum tax.27 The Fund observes that even if the conclusion is 
that these are undesirable schemes, they deserve a more thorough and 
realistic assessment. The fact that the approach taken by the OECD 
seems to be moving in the direction of formulary apportionment, 
notwithstanding its assertion that such an approach is not being 
pursued, reinforces the view that the merits of such ‘out of the box’ 
concepts do need to be thoroughly considered. 
 
IS THE FOCUS ON THE SYMPTOMS OR THE 
UNDERLYING CAUSES?  
These apparent contradictions in the BEPS project may in part stem 
from the proposals concentrating on the symptoms of an apparent 
conflict between international tax laws and current business behaviour, 
without sufficiently considering the source of the concerns and likely 
future developments. The source of many of the concerns or areas of 
pressure raised in BEPS is that firms are increasingly operating globally 
under a single operating structure, rather than a series of separately 
constituted and managed enterprises or subsidiaries within national 
jurisdictions. Global value chains are increasingly dominating world trade 
and associated with this is the rise of intra-firm trading. Technology, 
combined with the removal of impediments to trade in goods and 
services, is accommodating this trend. The increasing globalisation of 
firms’ operations and structures is challenging such concepts as the 
arm’s length principle. But technological developments will not stop. We 
will have more globally operating firms, more goods and services 
produced in the digital economy, and tax competition will not cease. The 
BEPS exercise is based on the realisation that current international tax 
laws are out of date with business practices. But will international tax 
laws always be playing catch-up with trends in global business 
operations? 
With this in mind, and in responding to past, current and likely ongoing 
trends in the global economy, some of the wider questions that the G20 
should consider include: 
                                                
27 IMF, “Issues in International Taxation and the Role of the IMF,” (Washington, DC, 28 
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• Are there wider reforms to corporate tax systems that need to be 
considered? 
• Should countries with a high reliance on corporate taxes, such as 
developing countries, be concerned about the ongoing sustainability 
of their tax base? 
• Is one of the lessons from BEPS that, given the increased mobility of 
capital associated with globalisation and increasing competition, 
there should be more of a move towards taxing less mobile factors of 
production and revenue heads that are less susceptible to base 
erosion? For example, the OECD discussion draft on the digital 
economy raises an important point, namely whether more attention 
should be placed on strengthening VAT, a tax on consumption, rather 
than attempting to extend income tax structures in an effort to 
effectively tax consumption. 
 
THE CASE FOR GREATER RELIANCE ON 
TRANSPARENCY 
Another basic issue that needs to be pursued is the power of 
transparency in combating corporate tax avoidance and evasion. 
Greater emphasis should be placed on requiring corporate tax payers to 
publicly explain their tax strategy, taxable income and tax paid in each 
jurisdiction in which they operate. Avoiding reputational damage can be 
a major motivation in minimising aggressive tax planning. There may be 
concerns that a corporation’s reputation will be inappropriately damaged 
with greater transparency. However, if there are valid reasons for a very 
low effective tax rate, or for the fact that a corporate has profits sourced 
from a small jurisdiction with low or no taxation, then it is up to the 
corporate to provide the explanation. 
It is worth recalling that the current focus on BEPS is itself the result of 
transparency, namely widespread public reporting of the low tax rates 
paid by some high-profile corporations in jurisdictions where they had 
substantial operations. The publicity around the tax strategies of some 
high-profile firms has not only resulted in public pressure on 
governments to respond, but has likely changed the behaviour of firms in 
terms of pursuing what might be seen as excessively aggressive tax 
minimisation devices. 
To the extent that greater publicity prevents some firms exploiting 
loopholes in the law, this will benefit the wider corporate community. As 
evident in many of the actions being pursued as part of the BEPS 
initiative, the OECD’s efforts to close what it perceives as problem areas 
in international tax law have involved sweeping measures that may 
impede legitimate activities that are not tax motivated. This is a major 
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concern raised in many of the comments on the OECD’s discussion draft 
on hybrid mismatch arrangements. 
 
THE START OF A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN 
GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
While the focus of the BEPS initiative is on the OECD/G20 Action Plan 
and the specific tax rules being reviewed, its significance is potentially 
much wider. In particular, it should be seen as the start of a fundamental 
change in the governance arrangements for international tax, one that 
expands beyond the OECD to cover emerging markets and developing 
countries. The OECD, through its Committee of Fiscal Affairs, has 
traditionally been the source of expertise on international tax issues and 
set standards for its members – and by weight of their economic 
significance – indirectly for other countries. The focus of the OECD’s 
work has been on bilateral treaties and standards for avoiding abusive 
transfer pricing. The United Nations has played a much smaller role in 
the area of international tax. The BEPS Action Plan has been extended 
beyond OECD members and is presented as an OECD/G20 initiative 
with the non-OECD G20 members participating in the negotiations in the 
Committee of Fiscal Affairs as equal members. The issues being 
addressed under the BEPS initiative are not one-off and the work will not 
be completed by the end of 2015. They are complex and ongoing. At the 
end of the existing timetable for the BEPS Action Plan, set for 15 
September 2015, the OECD will not be able to revert to negotiating 
international tax issues solely with its convention members.  
While the non-OECD G20 members are now participating on an equal 
basis with OECD members on the BEPS project, the involvement of 
developing countries is still an issue. It is commendable that Australia 
has signalled that a priority of the G20 in 2014 is to ensure that 
developing countries benefit from the tax agenda, and that it is seeking 
to more directly link the work being undertaken in the G20’s 
Development Working Group on improving the domestic revenue 
mobilisation of developing countries with the OECD/G20 BEPS project. 
The OECD is also using its consultative fora that incorporate developing 
countries, such as the Global Forum on Tax Treaties or the Global 
Forum on Transfer Pricing, to canvas the views of developing countries. 
However, these are very large meetings that are not conducive to 
detailed negotiations. The OECD has also said that it will consult with the 
UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. 
This is an under-resourced committee that comprises 25 members 
nominated by governments to act in an expert capacity. 
It is welcome that more attention is being given to the position of 
developing countries. They face particular challenges in dealing with 
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sophisticated multinationals in the context of limited capacity. The 
capacity constraints facing developing countries also limit their ability to 
take advantage of such international initiatives as the automatic 
exchange of tax information. The problems confronting developing 
countries have received little systemic attention. Moreover, there has not 
been a forum that brings together advanced economies, emerging 
markets and developing countries for an in-depth examination of the 
relevance of international tax principles in a rapidly changing global 
business environment. As noted previously, there is a need to examine 
the continuing application of the arm’s length principle to deal with intra-
firm transactions, the use of formulary apportionment and the wider use 
of minimum taxation. These issues are of particular relevance to 
developing countries, and their governments should be directly involved 
in negotiations. 
Australia should use its presidency of the G20 in 2014, combined with 
the focus being given to the BEPS project, to begin a discussion around 
more permanent changes to the arrangements for dealing with 
international tax issues. This should include not only formalising the 
participation of non-OECD G20 members beyond the timetable for the 
current BEPS initiative, but also mechanisms to more actively and 
directly involve developing countries. A first step could be to use the 
attendance of finance ministers at the IMF-World Bank annual meetings 
in October 2014 to convene a meeting of finance ministers from the 
OECD, G20 and a representative group of developing countries, to 
discuss a more inclusive approach to dealing with international tax 
issues on an ongoing basis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The BEPS project is an important initiative. But it is not simply a two-year 
project that will be completed in September 2015. It is part of an ongoing 
and accelerating process of dealing with the globalisation of business 
and the advancement of technology. What is required now is a 
strengthening of the ongoing work on international tax issues. The fifteen 
action items currently being advanced by the OECD represent ‘soft’ law, 
recommendations that will have to be implemented by national 
authorities. The G20 will have to provide the political will to ensure that 
the recommended changes are implemented. But the action items 
should be seen as steps along the road towards ensuring that tax 
arrangements keep pace with global business arrangements. Greater 
weight should be placed on the power of transparency in preventing 
excessively aggressive corporate tax minimisation strategies. However, 
the appropriateness of some traditional tax principles will need to be 
examined. It also needs to be recognised that the OECD/BEPS exercise 
represents a potentially far-reaching change in the global governance 
arrangements for considering international tax issues. As G20 chair in 
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2014, Australia should ensure that these developments are advanced in 
a considered way, and in particular look towards ensuring that 
developing countries are more directly involved in the process. 
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REPORT ON G20 AND 
DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 
DANIELA STRUBE1 
	
On 5 May 2014, the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy and Griffith University jointly hosted a G20 and 
Development conference in Brisbane. The following is a brief summary 
of some of the issues discussed at the conference. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
There has been much debate about the effectiveness and accountability 
of the G20’s role in promoting development, as it has been a prominent 
agenda item for leaders since the launch of the Seoul Development 
Consensus for Shared Growth at the Seoul Summit in 2010. For 
example, at the St Petersburg G20 Summit in 2013, the Russian 
presidency released a Development Accountability Report that, for the 
first time, tracked the G20’s performance in development. However, this 
report received criticism, in part because it was prepared by the G20 
Development Working Group itself. More broadly, the international 
development regime is also experiencing a revision of goals and 
objectives, not least because of the push to establish a ‘post-2015 
development agenda’ that will replace the Millennium Development 
Goals. Given the changing context of the G20’s own development 
priorities, the focus of the conference was to assess how the G20 can 
play a positive and productive role that adds value to the international 
effort to promote development.  
The conference consisted of four sessions. Session 1 provided an 
overview of the G20 as a global steering committee, discussing its 
performance and major challenges ahead. Session 2 addressed the 
G20 as a development actor. It particularly focused on issues of global 
governance, the G20 agenda and accountability. Session 3 was devoted 
to those development policy areas that are characterised by major 
overlaps with the G20’s ‘core’ agenda in economics and finance. Finally, 
Session 4 addressed other development policy areas that have, in some 
form, been part of the G20 development agenda, but that are not 
immediately related to the G20’s ‘core’ agenda. 
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SESSION 1. THE G20 AS A GLOBAL STEERING 
COMMITTEE: PERFORMANCE AND CHALLENGES 
Session 1 set the scene for the conference by discussing the 
performance of the G20 as a global steering committee and outlining the 
key challenges it would face in the future. Perspectives on the G20 were 
provided from an Australian, American, and a small non-G20 country 
(Singapore) viewpoint, alongside an African perspective that focused on 
the G20’s potential for supporting the continent’s development efforts. 
A common view held by participants was that, absent of reform, the G20 
may never recapture the clarity of purpose it demonstrated in responding 
to the global financial crisis in 2008. With a work program that has 
greatly expanded since 2008, a major challenge for the G20 is to be 
more strategic in selecting the issues that make it on to the leaders’ 
agenda. The G20 should focus on truly international policy areas that 
involve cross-border spillovers and where solutions cannot be achieved 
through unilateral action. Issues that meet this set of criteria include 
international trade, international tax, globally operating financial 
institutions, the governance and performance of international institutions, 
and climate change.  
In terms of specific actions the G20 can take in addressing these issues, 
it was noted that the G20 has neither enforcement power nor a 
secretariat. Its strength is that it can provide political guidance and 
momentum at the highest level to advance important global issues. In a 
similar vein, a general view emerged that the G20 had three 
fundamental functions, namely: problem-solving, agenda-setting and 
building ‘habits of cooperation’. It follows that the G20 has to focus on 
both providing a broad vision within the spirit of a global steering 
committee, as well as achieving specific tangible outcomes (described 
as the ‘bricks in the road’).  
The G20’s ongoing credibility was also questioned, an issue that has 
been aggravated by the failure of the US Congress to ratify quota reform 
within the IMF. The failure of G20 members to implement commitments, 
such as completing the 14th round of IMF quota reform, has damaged its 
legitimacy. One participant noted that a common view held by small 
countries is that the G20 undermines the legitimacy of multilateral 
institutions, a concern that is of particular importance to small states 
because of their vulnerabilities to spillovers from larger countries. 
Several speakers stressed that a crucial measure of the G20’s 
legitimacy is its effectiveness, and called for the G20 to provide more 
leadership on truly international issues, such as the role of the WTO, 
climate change and systemic risks in financial markets.  
Additional concern was raised over Africa’s inadequate representation in 
the G20. Although it was also acknowledged that African countries have 
to improve their coordination efforts so as to be able to make a more 
significant contribution in the forum, it was stressed that the G20 must 
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take on a more expansive view of developing countries as potential 
engines for global growth. That said, there was criticism about the 
disconnect between the G20’s growth and development agendas, and 
the lack of impact these work programs have had, and are having, on 
the lives of ‘ordinary Africans’. 
 
SESSION 2. THE G20 AS A DEVELOPMENT ACTOR: 
GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
This session contained presentations on long-term development 
challenges in the post-global financial crisis era, on evaluation of the 
G20 as a development actor, the perspective of civil society on the G20, 
as well as an Asia-Pacific perspective on development and the G20.  
Three implications of the global financial crisis for development were 
identified, namely: increasing inequality, growing poverty, and a decline 
in overseas development assistance (ODA). On the latter, it was noted 
that ODA contributions have followed a flat trend, at best, over recent 
decades. As a response, it was proposed that three principles should 
inform and influence the G20’s work on development. The first would 
see an orderly normalisation of macroeconomic policies and outcomes, 
as opposed to the extraordinary policies that have been introduced post 
the global financial crisis. Second, there must be recognition that the pro-
development impact of growth policies will only be achieved if specific 
attention is paid to the issue of inequality. Finally, as resource 
mobilisation is crucial to developing countries, the G20 can provide 
political leadership in creating or advocating for a more predictable aid 
framework, as well as a more holistic approach to development 
assistance. 
As a development actor, a key issue for the G20 is not only its actual 
focus, but also how it ‘frames’ its agenda. It was suggested that a 
credible ‘tale’ for the G20 to promote is that it is a provider of global 
public goods, rather than the exclusive club that it is portrayed as by 
critics. However, it was stressed that the G20’s development agenda 
must be more than a mere afterthought of its ‘core’ agenda. Instead, the 
G20 should actively promote ‘policy coherence for development’. The 
importance of linking the G20’s development efforts to the wider 
development debate was also highlighted. The global push for gender 
equality is just one example of an important development issue that the 
G20 can support. 
There exists a wide range of views among civil society on the G20, 
spanning those who refuse to engage with the G20 on the basis it is 
illegitimate, to others who recognise the forum’s limitations but 
nevertheless seek to promote a constructive dialogue with the G20. The 
unifying theme of civil society’s G20 work in 2014 has been inclusive 
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growth. Under this headline, civil society has identified four policy 
priorities for the G20: growth/employment, infrastructure, climate change 
and governance. 
Potential synergies between APEC and the G20 also came up for 
discussion. It was stressed that the objectives for cooperation between 
the two forums should be avoiding duplication and creating opportunities 
for exchange and cooperation. Previous coordination efforts were noted, 
and one unifying theme in the work of the two forums was the role of 
interaction between government officials and the private sector. 
 
SESSION 3. MAINSTREAMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
G20 AGENDA 
This session focused on those policy areas that have clear overlaps with 
the ‘core’ G20 agenda. It dealt with the question of how or whether 
development should be ‘mainstreamed’ into the G20’s ‘core’ agenda 
instead of being viewed as an add-on. Presentations covered foreign 
investment, trade liberalisation, tax and domestic revenue mobilisation, 
and the G20’s role in investment and infrastructure.  
The link between foreign direct investment and growth was explored, 
and the importance of foreign investment as a driver of growth was 
highlighted. Consideration was also given to the facilitation of foreign 
investment in a way that complements the G20’s trade agenda and the 
general transition towards a twenty-first century global economy. 
However, it was emphasised that a distinction needs to be made 
between the trade and development agendas. While trade talks may 
contribute to development outcomes, confusion between trade and 
development agendas should be avoided. Nevertheless, better 
cooperation between trade and development officials was identified as 
an area where improvements could be made. 
Several avenues were explored as to how the G20 can improve 
domestic revenue mobilisation within developing countries. First, it was 
proposed that the G20 should work towards turning the Publish What 
You Pay initiative, which focuses on the extractives industry, into a 
common global standard. Second, developing countries should be 
brought inside the tent of the OECD’s work on base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS), where they have previously been bystanders. Third, 
there is a real need to address the lack of capacity in tax administration 
that is prevalent in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
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SESSION 4. THE G20’S CONTRIBUTION IN OTHER 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AREAS 
The last session covered policy areas that have been part of, or related 
to, the G20 development agenda. Presentations covered food security, 
commodity price volatility, and how the G20 can make a meaningful 
contribution in areas such as capacity development and in contributing to 
the post-2015 development agenda. 
The topic of food security and commodity price volatility was introduced 
by reviewing the historic evidence regarding the frequency of food price 
shocks. The evidence provided suggested these events seem to occur 
regularly, and may be exacerbated by climate change. The need to 
address food security via international policy coordination was 
emphasised. It was also argued that efforts to minimise the ‘beggar thy 
neighbour’ aspect of food-related trade policy was of particular 
importance, and that this should be part of the G20’s trade agenda. In 
particular, it would be important to promote greater cooperation on − and 
greater transnational understanding of − export restrictions, for which no 
international agreements are currently in place. 
An overview was given of the IMF’s contribution to capacity development 
within developing countries. The overview noted that capacity 
development is a major, albeit less prominent, focus of the IMF (the 
other two major areas of assistance being in program support and 
surveillance). About 25 per cent of IMF resources are devoted to 
capacity development. 
A broader observation made on development was that the distinction 
between North and South is no longer appropriate for analysing global 
governance, and traditional approaches to development assistance also 
need to be challenged. It was noted that there has been a recent 
tendency of traditional donors to readjust their development policies to 
focus more on economic diplomacy. This development is visible in the 
emergent discussion around the likely priorities for the post-2015 
agenda, with economic aspects of development policy receiving more 
prominence than the social objectives of the MDGs. The G20’s Saint 
Petersburg Development Outlook follows this ‘economically’ focused 
approach. It was argued that the G20 needs to evaluate how it can 
support the post-2015 framework by finding synergies with its economic 
and ‘core’ financial agendas.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the conference provided an insightful debate about the key 
challenges for the G20’s development agenda at a dynamic time in the 
international development policy arena. There seemed to be broad 
consensus among participants that the G20’s development agenda must 
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be more than a mere add-on to its ‘core’ priorities. Development 
concerns should be considered appropriately in each and every aspect 
of the G20’s work streams, particularly trade, financial regulation, tax and 
climate change. Nevertheless, it was evident from the discussions that 
there is a strong view that the G20 is still searching for a clear narrative 
for its role as a development actor. This remains an important issue that 
the G20 must address. 
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